ABSTRACT Internet of Things (IoT) comprises of large number of smart devices that can exchange sensed data by availing online services. Smart devices can directly interact with the human beings for sensing the healthcare parameters and transmitting to a central repository. During the data exchange, it is mandatory to secure the messages between sender and receiver to handle the malicious human based attacks. For providing secure communication, a number of signature-based schemes are explored in literature but smart devices need more lightweight operations by ensuring desired security strengths. The main problem during signature based approaches is the computational overhead due to large real numbers required for signature and verification processes. This paper presents a light weight shortened complex digital signature algorithm for providing secure communication between smart devices in human centered IoT. We have used less extensive operations to achieve signature and verification processes like human beings do signatures on legal documents and verify later as per witness. We have also presented a multi-option parameter selection to use a signatureverification pair of expressions at particular index by adopting the common practice of human beings for using different signatures as per document criticality level. It enhances the security strength to guard against traffic analysis attacks. We have developed an experimental setup where a number of cell phones and smart devices are considered for secure communication using existing and proposed digital signature schemes. Results demonstrate the supremacy of our scheme as compared to preliminaries. 
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet is the largest public data network to facilitate social, military and commercial information exchange. In current era, Internet of Things (IoT) is getting a vastly growing interest due to its applicability in a wide range of innovative applications. IoT comprises of a large number of smart devices to share sensed data over internet to ultimately save at cloud repositories. Human centered IoT is an emerging area in every field of life, especially in business, online bank transaction, smart cards, healthcare, online correspondence and exchange of sensitive personal information [1] , [2] . A number of smart systems prefer the human intervention for initiating the automated tasks. A number of smart devices involve the social impact where the devices should be capable of transforming its functional model as per behavior of different human beings. It has boosted the growth of information exchange over the IoT and enabling networks. It includes cellular, vehicular and healthcare for human beings by supporting middleware [3] . However, the information exchanged in these applications is at risk due to fraudulent activists like hacking, viruses and individual or human error to change, duplicate or intercept the data. Due to this perception some questions arises that need proper attention. How secrecy can be maintained during transmission such that no human get unauthorized access to the information of transmitted message? How can the sender of the message ensure that the transmitted message exactly received by the intended recipient? How the recipient of message can verify the sender? Moreover, authentication, message integrity and confidentiality of the information are ultimate requirement for these applications to ensure security in human-centered IoT [4] .
Digital Signatures are used for authentication where private key is used for signing and public key is used for verification. Initially a message is signed with digital signature by sender before transmitting to recipient. It also contains hash of values to detect illegal modifications by malicious human intermediaries. Conventional and improved digital schemes are presented in [5] .
Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) has been used for transmission of electronic funds, interchange of data, distribution of software, storage of data Digital signature's security depends upon the private key of the signer. Digital signature consists of the signature generation and verification algorithms. Private Key of the signer is used for signing and Public key of the signatory is used to verify the signature by the recipient. Comparing with the physical signature, digital signature has the capability that, it cannot be changed nor copied by someone else, and also the signers of the signature cannot repudiate signature later. The process of Digital Signature generation and verification is shown in figure 1 [5] .
Digital signature are mainly applicable in following two scenarios. 1) Direct Digital Signature Scheme where message is sensitive to the receiver, like signature on tax information, personal and business transactions are such type of situations in which user A signs a message and transmits to user B that can verify the signature or prove the signature validity to any other users. 2) Arbitrated Digital Signature Scheme, the signed message firstly send to a trusted third party called arbiter to check the authenticity and integrity of that message. After complete verification it is forwarded to intended receiver [5] . An improved speed digital signature algorithm titled as ''isDSA'' that presents lightweight scheme where the complex modular inverse operation is eliminated. It uses modified s parameter of signature (r, s) by removing w component during verification. Moreover, the u 1 and u 2 sub-components used during verification are modified. It also pre-calculates and memorizes the redundant operations to improve computational cost by using modulo p as 1024 [6] . This paper presents a Lightweight Shortened Complex Digital Signature Algorithms (SCDSA) for Smart Devices in human-centered IoT. It uses the less extensive complex number based operations for generating the security credentials during signature and verification operations. The complete flow of the process is illustrated with a basic elaborative step by step exemplary values to show proof of concept. It reduces the computation and communication overhead along with better resilience as compared to existing real number base extensive operations in DSA based schemes. We have also proposed a Multi-option Parameter Selection (MPS) for SCDSA to keep it more secure against traffic analysis attacks. We have maintained a set of signature-verification pair calculations at specific indices that can be randomly chosen for signature and verification operations. It increases resilience against signature based message capturing attacks. We have developed an experimental setup using cellular and smart devices in human-centered IoT scenario using local level and inter network signature based messaging to measure the performance of our proposed scenario as compared to digital signature schemes. Results demonstrate that our scheme dominates as compared to counter parts in terms of time consumption for signature and verification process, verification time for message length variations, communication cost VOLUME 6, 2018 for signature based messaging with signatures, bytes revealed by subverting devices and the probability of compromising intermediate devices.
Rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explores the preliminaries for the digital signatures. Section-3 provides the related schemes and Section 4 explores the system model and problem identification. Section 5 elaborates the proposed SCDSA scheme along with multi-option parameter based signature and verification MPS. Section 6 includes results and analysis for existing and proposed scenario. Our work is concluded in Section 7.
II. PRELIMINARIES OF DIGITAL SIGNATURES
Background knowledge and related preliminary concepts regarding the digital signatures are discussed as follows;
A. ELGAMAL DIGITAL SIGNATURE SCHEME El-Gamal Digital Signature [7] which is nondeterministic signature because it uses a random number k, therefore this signature is used only for signing not for encryption. It provided basis for DSA, and its security is based on DLP. 
Now the Bob checks that if r = r then the signature has been modified by someone and the message is discarded otherwise it is considered acceptable in most cases.
III. LITERATURE REVIEW
In this section, we have explored different key distribution and digital signatures based schemes. We have categorized these schemes as per the computational method used and also explored the variants of standard digital signature mechanism. We have explored the symmetric and asymmetric approaches where former involves the same key for cryptographic operations and later requires public-private key pair between the two communicating parties. Symmetric keying is fastest but management of key exchange in a large network is more difficult, because the communicating parties must first agree on a session key for a certain time to encrypt all messages. It requires n (n − 1)/2 session keys for n users. Asymmetric keying is more complex as compared to symmetric cryptosystem. In case of n communicating parties, it requires 2n session keys. We have explored key distribution and signature based scheme in a categorical manner as follows.
A. KEY DISTRIBUTION AND SIGNATURE SCHEMES BASED ON DLP
The hard mathematical Discrete Logarithm problem (DLP) is used to design Digital Signature because of its hardness to breech when values are in the range of 100 to 200 digits. The log
a is solution for the equation a x = b, similarly for the two elements represented as g and h from cyclic group G then solving for x in g x = h is the procedure for DLP. The pairs from the group G are used on the basis of operation '' * ''. Consider the equation y = x a where x and y are two real numbers and a is an integer then y will be easily calculated if x and a are known, but when the values are large it becomes hard to extract the value of a from the known values of x and y. DSA, Hwang et al. [8] are based on discrete problem. Diffie and Hellman [9] first time presented the idea of public key cryptosystem. It allows participants to exchange security credentials over an insecure channel without prior sharing of secret information. But it suffers from man-in-themiddle attack due to absence of authentication. Shao [10] proposed a short signature scheme which achieves one fourth reduction in the length of signature and reduces computation of verification as compared to original DSA. Pairing is not used in this scheme due to which efficiency is high and implementation is easy. The signature length is 240 bits when key length is 160 bits is used along with SHA-1 or SHA-512 hash functions. Parida and Mohanty [11] presented a short signature scheme based on DLP and Biometric String. It takes DLP and biometric string as input. It reduces the length as well as the computation of the verification algorithm with similar level of the security. Lin et al. [12] presented a digital short signature scheme where signature is not verified without the designated verifier. Any third person is not able to verify the signature. Its security is proved in the random oracle model with low computation cost. Yao and Zhao [13] presented a new transformation scheme for digital signatures for the smart devices like RFID tags and smart cards with offline storage and online processing as well.
B. KEY DISTRIBUTION AND SIGNATURE SCHEMES BASED ON IFP
The design of DSA is based on Integer Factorization Problem (IFP) that uses two large prime numbers p and q where n = p * q [14] . One of the famous Algorithms based on IFP is RSA algorithm. In literature different researchers have used DLP, IFP or some hybrid approaches [15] . Rivest et. al. [16] presented first practical public key cryptosystem scheme on IFP which is based on the difficulty of factoring large numbers. It provides authentic encryption scheme with minimum key length of 1024 bits. Security strength is dependent on factorization of n. The scheme uses Richard Schroeppel's method for 200 digits that requires 1.2×1023 number of operations. A single operation consumes one microsecond then 3.8×109 years required for finding such factorization to break the security. The limitations of this scheme is that, the values of p and q are small and should be large prime to ensure infeasibility to direct guessing attack. Secondly, no proper digital signature scheme was designed in this work. Moldovyan [17] proposed a short signature scheme based on DSS that provide same security like RSA. Signature length is reduced to 320-bits with a hash function F H (.) that generates a value H of 160 bits and two 80-bit secret δ values where α is generator of δ-order group. The hash value can be calculated as given in (1) where U is random number and n is product of two prime numbers. Digital signature parameters g and k are given in (2) . The scheme is more secure with prime numbers used to generate very large n. If prime numbers v having values less than 160 bits then its security may be compromised.
Moldovyan [18] also proposed a short digital signature scheme based on IFP for the difficulty of factorization of a composite number which is the product of two large prime numbers. New improved digital signature schemes with small sizes were developed that ensures minimum security level group 2 80 operations to forge a digital signature. Due to selection of large prime numbers attack on this scheme is computationally infeasible. The scheme can be compromised when prime numbers values are less than 1024.
C. SIGNATURE SCHEMES BASED ON COMBINATION OF IFP AND DLP
Tahat et al. [19] proposed a new blind signature scheme based on combination of IFP and DLP to enhance the security strength with less computational complexity for signatures. It causes more computational overhead as compared to single hard problem. Verma and Sharma [20] has proposed a digital signature scheme to analyze the security against different attacks. The limitation of this scheme is more communication and computation overhead because of two hard problems calculations. Ismail et al. [21] proposed a new digital signature in which two secret keys are used for signature and two public keys for verification. This scheme has less than 1203T mul + T h time complexity for both signature generation and verification. It has less than 5T exp + 3T mul + T h computational complexity for sign and verification with less number of operations. The communication cost of this scheme is 3|n| + 4|P|. Sagheer and Mottar [22] uses complex operations to present existing public key cryptosystem with hard mathematical problem known as CDLP. It has shorter key length and provides enhanced and less costly security as compared to DLP. Diffie-Hellman Key exchange, El-Gamal and Massey-Omura public-key cryptosystems proved that the security based on CDLP is stronger than DLP. Repeated squaring and multiplication algorithms are used to compute complex numbers exponentiation in the complex field group. If the value of the CDLP is calculated for q bit then it requires square times operation to solve it. Operation complexity of CDLP is immediately increased with the increases of size as compared to DLP.
D. DIGITAL SIGNATURE BASED ON APPLYING HASH ROUND FUNCTION BEFORE SIGNING
Chen and Shen [23] have presented a new digital signature scheme in which hash round function is applied before the signature. To overcome the active attacks author used a new digital signature scheme Hash Round Function and SelfCertified Public Key System DSA. H-S DSA is similar as ELGamal DSA in the format and it is more secure and having less time complexity. Its security depends on oneway hash function, DLP and IFP. H-S DSA has presented VOLUME 6, 2018
four steps including initialization, user registration, signature and verification of signature. Performance analysis explores the security strength against different password based attacks. Zhang [24] has addressed the security weakness of the El-Gamal Digital signature that the repeated usage of random number makes the possibility of security breaking. An improved El-Gamal digital signature scheme has been presented with the pairs of private keys (x, d). For this scheme there is no need to remember the value of k. It reduces the computation and storage costs. El-Gamal digital signatures are improved by using of a random number t with signature and applying modular inversion. It increases the signature length due to t. Multi-Signature Schemes require digital signature more than one key for signing a same message. It is used in commercial organizations where a document is required to sign by more than one person in a collaborative and simultaneous manner. For example when a company issues cheque, mostly it required the signature of more than one authorized persons [25] , [26] . Ferng and Khoa [27] has presented a DS based scheme for end-to-end data authentication in small sensors deployed in clusters. Due to availability of powerful cluster heads, digital signature based messages are exchanged in a local level communication in a secure manner.
E. MORE DIGITAL SIGNATURE BASED SCHEMES
In ECDSA based scheme, a low cost signature generation is achieved by precomputing the randomly selected discrete log pairs to perform modular operations to reduce computational costs. Its performance is based on selection of precomputed pairs that how many more extensive pairs are randomly selected. It was further improved by managing the memory access by currently communicating devices by considering energy harvesting low power devices in IoT and WSN [28] . Bauer has analyzed the cost of signature based data sharing and integrity protection between end-to-end light weight devices in IoT. A hardware accelerator based ECDSA signing solution proves that it consumes little cost but no significant energy reductions [29] . Mossinger [30] analyzed ARM-based hardware to measure cost of signing and concluded that it can add a little cost in addition to encryption. For end-to-end message integrity protection, digital signatures are presented for Javascript Object Notation (JSON) based data. The JSON sensor signature (JSS) [31] explores integrity of sensor readings in IoT scenario. 
IV. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION
By using p, q and g, a user prepares private key x and computes public key y. Hash of the message is calculated and random number k per message is generated to calculate s using Function II as given in (4) and illustrated in figure 2 .
The problem of the existing DSA is high communication and computation overhead. Because size of p is 512 bits and q is 160 bits bits. The value of base number g is in the range of 512 bits and must be greater than 1. Every message carries more than 1185 extra bits for digital signature.
If we suppose to select small numbers then the DLP can be compromised and the value of private key could be easily determined by intruders. If large numbers are selected FIGURE 2. Digital signature process with two functions for r and s.
to increase security strength then it also increases computation and communication overhead per message. During the verification, two functions s , q = (s ) −1 mod q and (g (H(M )×w) mod q y r w mod q) mod p) mod q are used with public key and signatures of sender.
V. SHORTENED COMPLEX DIGITAL SIGNATURE ALGORITHM
We have proposed Shortened Complex Digital Signature Algorithm (SCDSA) that uses a novel method based on short complex numbers for signature and verification operations. Our scheme achieves better security for smaller bit sizes as compare to previous digital signature schemes based on DLP, IFP. Complex public key cryptosystem uses complex numbers which is a mathematically hard problems instead of real numbers. A complex number C = a + bi where ''a'' part is real number and ''bi'' represents an Imaginary part. An imaginary part consist of i where i = √ −1. The use of CDLP for designing SCDSA makes it more secure as compared to preliminaries. We have adopted one way secure hash function SHA-1 to fix the size of r to 160 bits which is first component of Digital Signature. Length of the signature is equal to |hash(m)| + |q|. A list of notations is provided in table 1 for SCDSA. Digital signature consists of a string of bits computed by some rules and set of parameters that are used to identify the signatory and integrity of the message to be verified. SCDSA uses public integer (n, g, r) as parameters which are known to a common group of users. The value of n must be large enough that the discrete log cannot be easily calculated. Private key Va of the signer like Alice is used to sign a message and corresponding public key is used for signature verification. A random number k is used for the generation of the signature for every message. The greatest common devisor (GCD) of (k, n − 1) = 1 and k must be secretly chosen by signer. The required signature is S = (r, s) and signature length is |hash (M )| + |q|. In this research work, we present the single mode and multi-mode signature schemes where the former is SCDSA where a predefined expression is used to generate signature. The latter includes the MPS-SCDSA approach where a set of expressions is available to signer by randomly selecting the index number. Figure 3 elucidates the signature and verification processes at signer like Alice and verifier like bob respectively.
A. SCDSA -SIGNATURE AND VERIFICATION PROCESSES
During the signature process, initially the random number k, is generated and then base number g is selected from the finite field. After that the value of g k is computed using squaring and multiplication method. The message m is concatenated with g k and then SHA-1 based hash function is used to fix its length to 160 bits or 256 bits. In this way, the r part of digital signature is generated. Similarly the s part of digital signature is generated in F2 by using r, n, va, and k. The value of k is considered to be random and unique for each signature to ensure its strength. It has been calculated by involving the private key and the existing hash for strengthening randomness.
PseudoCode I -Signature Process on m
Random number k gernerate 2. r = hash (g k mod n m) 3. s = k/(r + va) mod q Signature = (r, s) Signature length: |hash(.)| + |q|
PseudoCode II -Verification Process on received message
In this section we present example of Alice as A s for signing and Bob as receiver B r for verification process. Initially, a finite field Fq and large prime numbers up to 100 or 200 digits is chosen. Then publically define a complex number g which belongs to finite field Fq and of order n. On the basis of parameters, Alice chooses Private Key Va and generates public key Pa = g Va mod n. Private key is secret and public key is transferred to Bob. The function F 1 = ((g k mod n) m) and its SHA-1 based hash function is calculated to get r as per step 2 in pseudocode I. Similarly, F 2 = k/(r + Va) mod q which is equal to s according to step 3. Now Digital Signature (r, s) is generated by A s as illustrated in figure 4 and then transmitted to B r along with public key.
In the verification process at receiver Bob as B r , the public key of sender Pa, complex base number g, modulus n and signature (r, s) are used to calculate g k . Message m is concatenated with g k and Hash function is applied to it to get r. Now r is compared with r to ensure similarity otherwise it is considered to be compromised in between transition. For example, when Bob receives the public key Pa along with r and s to verify the digital signature. Similarly Bob selects his private key ''Vb'' and generate public key Pb = g Vb mod n. For signature generation k is randomly selected from finite field Fn and keeps it secret to calculate r'. Bob uses function F 3 = (Pa * g r ) s to calculate to calculate g k as per the step 1 of PseudoCode II for verification process. After that, SHA-1 based hash is calculated for the output of function F 4 = g k m to calculate r as per step 2. Finally, the values of r and r are compared as illustrated in figure 5 . If these values are same then the message is considered original as sent by Alice, otherwise, the message is being changed by some intermediary node or human being. Moreover, the correctness proof for verification of g k using (Pa * g r ) s is presented in Proof-I.
Our mathematical implementation involves the complex operations that are harder and infeasible to calculate by hand. We have analytically presented calculations of our scheme with small values of parameters to calculate and understand it easily as explored stepwise in following example.
1) BASIC PARAMETERS
For exploring the example, we have considered a 10 digits value of q = 1234567899 and the finite field is Fq = {0, 1, 2, 3, . . . , 1234567898}. The value of n is also 10 digits as n = 591558727 and g belong to finite field Fq with order n. Moreover, the complex numbers selected from the above finite field Fq is g = (11+12i) and Fn = {0, 1, 2, . . . , n−1}.
2) KEY GENERATION
Let Alice's private key is Va = 5, g = (11 + 12i), n = 7 and q = 3. Public key of Alice is Pa = g Va mod n which is equal to (11 + 12i) 5 mod 7 = (((11 + 12i) 2 ) 2 (11 + 12i)) mod 7 = (−2, −3). Value of g Va is calculated by using squaring and multiplying method where Va = 5 whose binary value is 101. For first bit initialize the value of g, and for bit = 0, calculate square and for last bit = 1 we have presented calculation in table 2. By using squaring and multiplying method solve the g 9 where Bob's private key is Vb = 9, n = 7, g = (11, 12). Public keyPb = g Vb mod n = (11 + 12i) 9 mod 7 is as explored in table 3. 
3) SIGNATURE PROCESS
During signing, the value of k = 4 is randomly selected from Fn for message m and calculated the value of r as r = hash (g k mod n m). In this regard, we have first calculated g k = g 4 = (−26367 − 7544i) by using square and multiplication method as illustrated in table 4. Public key is g 4 mod 7 = (−26367 − 7544i) mod 7 = (5+5i) and final signature is (r, s). 
4) VERIFICATION PROCESS
During the verification process in this example, we have used r = hash (g k ||m) = hash (5 + 5i) ||helloMsg = ''861f015 1cfe95a52173d6faaae0b2708214c84d6''. By converting the hexadecimal value into decimal, we get 2594279640500000 0000000000000 as shown in table 5. 
B. MULTI-OPTION PARAMETER SELECTION (MPS-SCDSA)
We have further extended SCDSA by including Multi-option Parameter Selection (MPS) approach to improve the security strength. We have provided multiple expressions for signature and verification process at indices 1 to 4 in table 6. It also contains the correctness proves to ensure that the fraction used during signature can result in same value when calculated at receiver during verification. Moreover the combination of addition and multiply operations are adopted for signature and verification. Similarly the subtraction and divide operations are also adopted. At the time of signing, the user can dynamically select one of the index for s parameter calculation. The signer, uses the randomly selected parameter that increases the level of confusion for the attacker during traffic analysis. Moreover, a single user generate different cipher text for multiple receivers. On the receiving side, g k at same index is selected for verification process. For example, when s = k/(va − r) mod q is selected for signing then (Pa/g r ) s mod n is used for verification. It achieves the flexibility that the signatures generated using private key of sender can be verified at receiver by using the public key of sender. In this way, a single user can generate different type of signature values that are verifiable by using the index id of signature and verification pair. In this scenario, the index value can be concatenated in the signature as well for identification at receiver. It can guard against the traffic analysis attacks where the probability of guessing the particular signature-verification pair is too complex. Moreover, we have further strengthened it by using the different symmetric keys for signatures and encryption to differentiate that encrypted messages does not always represent signing process. It also reduces the total number of signature based messages exchanged on the network that also reduces chances of compromising signatures.
VI. FORMAL MODELING AND ANALYSIS OF SCDSA
We have formally verified the SCDSA using the Nonmonotonic Cryptographic Protocol (NCP) or Rubin Logic [32] which provides near to implementation modeling and analysis. It comprises of a number of sets for maintaining the realistic data in possession sub set POSS() as maintained by data structures in RAM. Similarly belief sub set BEL() contains the values of variables that are verified and should be kept in storage for future use. Initially the temporary and locally processed values are kept in POSS() set and then after processing only a few values are saved in BEL() set and extra variables can be removed from POSS using forget() operation. A number of supported operations can also be verified between sender and receiver as per flow of actual execution but in a model based approach. A number of cryptographic operations including encryption, decryption, hashing for integrity protection along, signature and verification can be modeled. Moreover, the send, receive, concatenate and refresh operations can also be used during modeling phase. For the analysis part, it also compares the state of the storage for POSS() and BEL() subsets. In Rubin Logic, global set is contains set of entities, their roles, and set of globally accessible variables. A list of notations is presented in table 7. The local set contains the POSS(), BEL() and behavior list BL() subsets as illustrated in table 8 for signature process at Sender A s and verification process at receiver B r . We have stepwise presented the operations involved during signature and verification processes along with a number of variables for storing calculated values. It utilizes square, multiply, modulus, concatenation, power, hash and compare operations.
VII. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we have discussed about implementation, results and analysis. We have used Crypto++ library for DSA along with private-public keys for the implementation of signature-verification functions in respective classes. For the ECDSA, we have linked the borZoi library which is also based on C++. It also supports better SHA-1 (FIPS 180-1) for hash function. Moreover, we have tested the ECDsa which is an abstract base class in C# whereas ECDsaCng class is created as its child class for overriding the functions to provide functionality for ECDSA algorithm in Cryptography Next Generation (CNG). We have performed multiple executions for signature-verification operations using DSA, EDSA, our proposed SCDSA and MPS-SCDSA. Results are extracted for signature and verification execution time, impact of message length over verification time, communication for messages with signature and resilience against human operated capturing attacks or by some intelligent machines. Experimental results prove the dominance of our proposed schemes as compared to counterparts.
A. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Security analysis of DLP based DSA measured using by Baby-Step and Giant-Step method. The running time and memory storage of this algorithm has been considered for the measurement of security. The running time of the algorithm is analyzed in term of input size in bits and computation time. Step and Giant-Step method. Using the complex number for Shortened Digital signature is n time secure than m, where n m even whenever our proposed scheme designed by using very small complex number instead of largest real number. It provides authentication, message integrity and non-repudiation for the messages exchanged using our SCDSA scheme. Its strength is more rigorous against traffic analysis attacks when using our proposed MPS-SCDSA scheme. Figure 6 elucidates the time consumed during signature operation of a message for different values of k varying from 0 to 40 in case of DSA and SCDSA. We have performed these experiments multiple times on an average of 20 times to get accurate values. The values of base number g is kept constant as 123235 for DSA and (123235+23i) for SCDSA where 23i is added to make it complex number like (a + bi). For k = 36, DSA requires 1203.072 milliseconds whereas our proposed SCDSA dominates by consuming only 922.934 milliseconds. It is due to the fact that computation of DSA takes more operations for calculation of public key P a and other power consuming calculations during signature operation. For SCDSA the number of operations are minimized and hence the time consumption is reduced. C. VERIFICATION TIME CONSUMPTION Figure 7 elucidates the comparison of time taken during verification process by changing the number k. Results show that for k = 36, execution time for verification is 983.834 milliseconds for DSA whereas our proposed SCDSA massively dominates by consuming just 95.953 milliseconds. This is the reason that squaring and multiplying method used for verification determine the value of r efficiently with less computation and holding same security strengths. Moreover, the steps required for getting the value of g k are computationally very less extensive as compared to DSA. In our scheme only two operations are used one for the value of g k and the other for the comparison computation of r . Figure 8 elucidates the impact of changing message length by adding more characters from 25 characters up to 100 characters. In case of message length = 75, the signature and verification time of DSA is 1010 milliseconds and 570 milliseconds for our proposed SCDSA.
B. TIME CONSUMPTION FOR SIGNATURE OPERATION

D. VERIFICATION TIME FOR MESSAGE LENGTH VARIATIONS
E. COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD
In this section, we have analyzed the impact over communication overhead by varying number of messages with digital signatures as illustrated in figure 9 . In case of DSA, we have considered the parameters like n as 512 to 1024 bits, q of 160 bits and g is in the range of finite field as 512 bits. According to signature algorithm, size of |r| = |q| = 160 bits, |s| = |n|+|H (M)| = 512 bits + 160 bits. Moreover, signature length is |q| + |n| + 160 = 160 + 512 + 160 = 832 bits per message. Signature size for ECDSA [29] is also same as 832 bits. In our proposed scheme, according to pseudocode I and II the value of r and q are 160 bits each. Signature length = 160 + |q| = 160 + 160 = 320 bits. Communication overhead is reduced approximately 60% per message. 
F. RESILIENCE
During secure communication between smart devices from different regions, there are the intermediate devices for forwarding the messages to destination. The intermediaries may be captured by the intruders to expose the messages in transit. We have analyzed that the probability P β for finding the chances of occurrence of an intermediate compromised node is given in (5) where N represents total devices in the network and β represents the count of compromised devices. Sender and receiver should be considered as noble means non-malicious so excluding them from total devices is represented as N−2. Now to suppose that intermediate node is also not compromised that shows N−3. Subtraction from 1 gives us the probability of compromising an intermediate device. 
By compromising a device, intruder can extract the security credentials and processed data stored in that device. Secondly, all the traffic passing through that node can also be captured and analyzed for future active attack. We have measured the probability of capturing the signature based messages when a number of total messages are grabbed from the traffic by intruders. Probability Pr ω that a particular signature based message and its security credentials are captured is given in (6) where ω represents captured messages out of total M messages transmitted on the network. We have used the message sizes as 832 bits for DSA, SCDSA and 320 bits for our proposed SCDSA and MPS-SCDSA respectively. The fraction of communication compromised FC c is given in (7) where message size is represented as γ . Figure 11 illustrates that when 24 signature based messages are captured out of 50 messages then FC c is 0.39 for DSA and ECDSA whereas 0.15 and 0.016 for SCDSA and MPS-SCDSA respectively. Our proposed scheme dominates the DSA based schemes by exposing very less fraction of communication.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In human centered IoT, security of sensitive data is mandatory to provide dependable solution against forgery attacks. Digital Signatures are considered to be the reliable option in asymmetric cryptography to ensure the ownership and authenticity of the communication parties. This paper presents a Shortened Complex Digital Signature for securing communication in human-centered IoT scenario. We have also presented a multi-option parameter selection mechanism where the signature-verification pairs of expression at particular index can be selected to calculate security credentials. It improves the security against traffic capturing attacks. Results demonstrate the dominance of our scheme as compared to counterparts in terms of computation and communication overheads along with resilience analysis. Proposed SCDSA and MPS-SCDSA schemes achieve less computational time and communication overhead during signature and verification operations along with better resilience against capturing attacks. Moreover, it is very hard to break SCDSA based on CDLP as compared to DSA which is based on DLP.
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